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Abstract Quantum secure direct communication protocols offer confidential trans-
mission of classic information over quantum channel without prior key agreement.
The ping-pong based protocols provide asymptotic security and detailed analysis of
security level provided by each variant of the protocol is required. The paper presents
a general method of calculation of the eavesdropped information as a function of the
attack detection probability. The method is applied to the ping-pong protocol based
on completely entangled pairs of qudits. The upper and lower bounds on the amount
of the leaked information and eavesdropping detection probability are provided.
Keywords Quantum cryptography · Quantum secure direct communication ·
Ping-pong protocol
1 Introduction
The research in quantum cryptography, mainly motivated by the promise of prov-
able security based on the laws of physics, is intensively continued since the seminal
paper of Bennet and Brassard [4]. The first proposals [4,12] addressed the problem
of quantum key distribution (QKD). The QKD protocols are supposed to fill in the
gap appeared after publication of Shor’s algorithm [21], which is able to break Rivest,
Shamir, Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem [20] in polynomial time [27,28]. However,
information resulting from QKD execution is not determined by either of parties but
is settled by the protocol completion itself, thus protocols of this kind are not suit-
able for direct communication and have to be combined with classic cryptography.
Moreover, in QKD protocols, quantum communication must be assisted by classic
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privacy amplification algorithms which diminish eavesdropper knowledge about the
key under agreement at the price of quantum resources wasting. In effect the informa-
tion throughput in QKD protocols is low.
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocols are designed for classic
information transfer over a quantum channel. They provide unidirectional communica-
tion in which information content is specified by the sender. The first QSDC protocol,
based on a single photon transmission, was proposed by Beige et al. [2]. Later, Bos-
tröm and Felbinger [5] proposed the ping-pong protocol based on EPR pairs. Since
then many enhancements and modifications of the ping-pong protocol paradigm have
been published including superdense coding [7], usage of GHZ states for two [13]
and multiparty [8] communication, and variants based on higher dimensional systems
i.e. qutrits [1,24] and qudits [11]. The original protocol is provably asymptotically
secure in case of a perfect quantum channel [5], and although it has been successfully
attacked for noisy channels [25,29], there exist simple countermeasures that restore its
security [6]. The security of ping-pong protocol based on GHZ states [22] and qutrits
[23] has been studied too. It has been shown that their security properties are very
similar to the original version except for multiparty variants which are vulnerable to
double CNOT attack [26].
The ping-pong protocol derivatives that utilize transmission of signal particles by
blocks provide better security characteristics [18,24]. But protocols of that kind require
quantum memory registers—the technique which is not fully developed in present pho-
tonic technology [10]. Protocol asymptotic security may be also improved by some
additional message processing analogous to privacy amplification in QKD protocols
[9,15]. Thus, the variants based on the original version of the protocol are much closer
to experimental implementation [19]. However, the general case of the ping-pong pro-
tocol based on pairs of maximally entangled qudits has not been in depth analyzed
yet [24]. The aim of this paper is to fill in this gap. The approach presented here is a
generalization of the methods presented in [5,23]. The method is applied to the vari-
ant with a superdense information coding and an eavesdropping detection performed
in a computational basis or two mutually unbiased bases (MUB) [3]. It is proved
that the considered protocol is insecure, i.e. eavesdropper can gain some information
without being detected, when control mode is executed only in a computational base
and asymptotically secure when two MUBs are used. Moreover, the optimal detection
strategy is designed. Closed form expressions that relate the minimum attack detection
probability and the maximum leaked information to the qudit size are also provided
for that case.
2 The ping-pong protocol in short
In the provided protocol description, Alice and Bob are legitimate parties and Eve
is a malicious eavesdropper. The ping-pong protocol operates in two modes. In the
message mode Alice sends information to Bob, while in the control mode the com-
municating parties check for the presence of the eavesdropper. The communication
process is started by Bob, the recipient of information, who prepares two maximally
entangled qudits. Without loss of generality it may be assumed that it is in the state [11]
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One of the qudits, denoted as “home”, is kept confidential, while the the second one,
named the “travel”, is send to Alice. Alice randomly selects message mode or control










|k + β〉t 〈k|t (2)
where summation within a ket is performed mod N . The message is encoded in α,
β = 0, . . . , N − 1 so Alice can encode 2 log2 (N ) bits per one protocol cycle. The
entanglement of qudits causes that Alice’s local operations have non local effects.
The state composed from home and travel qudits is transformed into another maxi-
mally entangled state |ψα,β〉. Next, the transformed qudit is send back to Bob, who
performs collective measurement on both qudits. There exists one-to-one correspon-
dence between state detected by Bob and values of α and β, so Bob can decode
information sent by Alice.
However, such scheme can be attacked by an eavesdropping Eve. Although the
travel qudit looks for her as maximally mixed, she can attach, according to the dilation
theorem [14], an ancilla system of dimension N 2 that purifies the travel qudit. She
can than entangle the qudit with the ancilla by some unitary operation. Because of
the introduced entanglement the encoding operations Uα,β of Alice also transform the
ancilla system. However, Eve’s eavesdropping introduces transmission errors as a side
effect, which are perceived by Alice and Bob as noise.
The special control mode is used for an eavesdropping detection. Alice switches to
control mode in some randomly selected protocol cycles. In this mode she measures
the received travel qudit in one of mutually unbiased bases. The fact of switching into
control mode and the measurement basis are announced via public classic channel.
It is assumed that although public information is accessible to Eve, she can’t control
its content. Bob subsequently measures the home qudit in the same basis and asks
Alice to reveal the value of her measurement. Because of the fragile entanglement
of the two-qudit system the result of Bob’s measurement is fully determined by the
information about the used basis and value obtained by Alice. Any deviation from that
correlation indicates the presence of Eve.
3 Security analysis
Eve sees the travel qudit as a maximally mixed state, so without loss of generality it








The best she can do is to entangle the qudit with the ancilla system and infer some
information about encoding transformation from the measurement of the composite
system. However, any mixed state in the basic space of dim (H ) may be treated as the
partial trace of the pure state living in space with attached ancilla of size dim (HE ) ≤
dim (H )×dim (H ). The operation A introducing entanglement between travel qudit
and the ancilla system is unitary and may be described as
|ψ(s)〉 = A|s, φ〉 =
N−1∑
l=0
al,s |l, φs,l〉 (4)
where the |φs,l〉 denote Eve’s probe states. There exist exactly N such states for each
|s〉 so Eve has to use N 2 probes. The state of the travel qudit and the attached ancilla
after Alice’s encoding operation takes the form








ak,s |k + β〉|φs,k〉 (5)
Lets assume that encoding operations used by Alice are equally probable and consider














k,0|k + β〉|φ0,k〉〈φ0,k |〈k + β| (6)
There exist N 2 vectors |k + β〉|φ0,k〉, but fixing β selects the subspace spanned by
N vectors. It follows that density matrix of size N 2 × N 2 may be factorized into N
submatrices of size N × N . Moreover each of those matrices is diagonal.
The maximal mutual information IAE between Alice and Eve is limited by the
Holevo bound






























λk log2 λk (8)
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∣∣2 = 1 has been used. It is worth to note that
p(0) = ∣∣a0,0
∣∣2 (10)
is a non-detection probability when control mode is executed in computational basis.
The equations (9) and (10) represent opposed interests of the Eve: she has to choose
the attack operation in which the non-detection probability and the mutual information
IAE are maximized.
4 Results
Information accessible to Eve as a function of a non-detection probability was numer-
ically computed using (9) and (10) for randomly generated unitary matrices represent-
ing an attack operator A. Results obtained for N = 3, 4, 5 are illustrated on Fig. 1.
But before delving into an analysis of the numerical results it is reasonable to con-







p m = n
1 − p n = (m + 1) mod N
0 otherwise
(11)
where p represents a non-detection probability. In this case the mutual information
between Alice and Eve equals to
I minAE = log2 N − p log2 (p) − (1 − p) log2 (1 − p) (12)




p m = n
(1 − p) / (N − 1) m = n (13)
In such situation
I maxAE = I minAE + (1 − p) log2 (N − 1) (14)
The curves (12) and (14) are also shown on Fig. 1. It is immediately visible that they
represent lower and upper bound of information accessible to the eavesdropper. The























































Fig. 1 Information accessible to the eavesdropper as a function of a non-detection probability in a com-
putational base
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case the non-detection probability equals to 1/N i.e. for larger N the attack providing
maximal possible information is detected with higher probability. If Eve implements
attacks that are harder to detect then mutual information is diminished. In the limit-
ing case when Eve is totally hidden (p = 1) she has knowledge about a half of the
transmission content. It is also visible that randomly selected attack transformations
are concentrated around the point in which Eve gets most information but is detected
with high probability. The results presented herein are in perfect agreement with the
analysis of the qutrit based protocol presented in [23]. It immediately follows that
all qudit based ping-pong protocols that use superdense coding and an eavesdropping
detection only in the computational basis are not secure because in this case Eve has
an access to at least a half of the message content.
Alice and Bob may improve detection capabilities if they perform control measure-
ments in more than one base. In this case Alice must also announce the basis in which
control measurement was performed. However, the basis selected by Alice cannot be
arbitrary. It is also desirable, that an attack not detected in one of the bases would
induce a maximal disturbance in the other one. Such situation takes place if the bases
are mutually unbiased (MUB), i.e. the scalar product of any two base vectors taken
from different bases is equal to 1/
√
N . The problem of construction of the complete
set of MUBs in the Hilbert space of an arbitrary dimension has not been solved yet [3].
Presently it is known how to construct complete set of MUB in spaces of dimension
being a power of prime. It has been also proved that at least three MUB exists in spaces
with N ≥ 2. In the following analysis it will be assumed that Alice randomly selects
between two MUBs, i.e. computational basis and the one obtained by QFT.















|k〉|k〉 = |ψ0,0〉 (16)
Thus if Alice measures eigenvalue corresponding the state |xk〉, the collapse causes
the home qudit will be in the state |xN−k〉 and the result of Bob’s measurement is fully
determined.








cl,k |xl , φk,l〉 (17)
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is a non-detection probability in the new basis. It follows that if a non-detection prob-




than in the new base
the attack will be detected with probability 1 − ∣∣cl,l
∣∣2 = (N − 1)/N— an attack
undetectable in one basis is detected with a high probability in the second. Thus, Alice
and Bob can implement more efficient eavesdropping detection. Let us consider the
case when Bob “sends” |0〉. In control mode Alice randomly selects measurement
basis. If ν is a fraction of control modes executed in the |xk〉 basis then the long term
non-detection probability equals to
d = (1 − ν) ∣∣a0,0
∣∣2 + ν ∣∣c0,0
∣∣2 (20)






















The non detection probability
∣∣c0,0
∣∣2 in the x basis is maximal when all coefficients
a0,n are in phase. Again, lets consider distribution (13) and assume that all coefficients
are real. The long term non-detection probability is then represented by the function
d (p) = (1 − ν)p + ν
(
p + 2√N − 1√p(1 − p) + (N − 1)(1 − p)
)
/N (22)
where p = ∣∣a0,0
∣∣2 is a non-detection probability in computational base. It follows from
symmetry conditions that an eavesdropping is detected with highest probability when
bases are selected equally frequently in the control mode. In this case the long term
non-detection probability does not exceed the upper bound dmax = (√1/N + 1)/2
and that maximal value is achieved for pmax = (√1/N + 1)/2. It follows that Eve
never intercepts more than
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bits. Values of I maxAE (dmax) are also marked on Fig. 2.
Eve’s information as a function function of the long term probability for the con-
sidered values of N = 3, 4, 5 are presented on Fig. 2. It follows that in the worst case
Eve can still access all the information posted by Alice. It is visible that dmax is an
upper bound on the long term non-detection probability. Thus, Eve’s attack is always
detected with non-zero probability when two bases are used in control mode. An
eavesdropping detection preformed in many subsequent control mode cycles provides
asymptotic protocol security. Moreover, the maximum probability of non-detection
gets lower as the dimension of a qudit is enlarged, and the given security level is
reached faster.
5 Conclusion
The numerical experiments and theoretical analysis reveal a tradeoff between an eaves-
dropping detectability and an information leakage. The maximal intercepted informa-
tion is equal to the total channel capacity and the probability of a non-detection of such
attack is diminished as the number of available states of the signal particle is enlarged.
However, the control mode using only the computational basis is not sufficient, as
in this case Eve can reproduce half of the message content and stay undetected what
renders protocol insecurity. The presented results prove that problem is resolved when
at least two mutually unbiased bases are used in control mode. For an optimal eaves-
dropping detectability bases should be selected with equal probability. In this case
attacks are detected with probability not less than 1 − d (pmax) = (1 − 1/
√
N )/2 and
an eavesdropper’s information gain for the least detectable attacks cannot exceed the
value given by (23). The usage of multiple MUBs guarantees protocol quasi security,
that is, there exists finite nonzero probability that an eavesdropper intercepts some part
of the message without being detected. Some additional message processing analo-
gous to privacy amplification in QKD protocols is required [9,15] to improve protocol
security profile.
The method presented herein can be applied not only to variants when one qudit
particle is used for signaling, but also, almost without any modifications, to schemes
based on multiple qubits and GHZ states. The approach seems to be very useful, as
the QSCD protocols are one of the most actively developed branches of quantum
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Fig. 2 Information accessible to the eavesdropper in the qudits based ping-pong protocol as a function
of a long term non-detection probability
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